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Which clippings match 'Explanatory Concept Of Engagement' keyword pg.1 of 1
03 OCTOBER 2014

Arnold Berleant: engagement as the participatory alternative to the aesthetic concept of disinterestedness

"Berleant (1991) proposes the explanatory concept of engagement as the participatory alternative to the aesthetic concept of disinterestedness and illustrates throughout his work the essentially participatory nature of appreciating art, nature, and the human built environment. Some forms of participation are overt in nature and require people to physically interact with the artwork – e.g. an artwork may require people to physically interaction in order to experience the artwork. Yet, Berleant argues, even more 'traditional' artworks require participatory engagement in that they are realized in the reciprocal relation between person and artwork. When we are immersed in aesthetic appreciation of an artwork, e.g. a painting, it is a process of participatory engagement in which we may imaginatively enter and explore the space of the painting. Moreover, engagement, according to Berleant, unfolds within a complex field of forces – the aesthetic field - that shape peoples experience Berleant (1970)"

(Christian Dindler and Peter Dalsgaard, 2009, p.2-3)

Berleant, A. (1991). 'Art and Engagement', Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Berleant, A. (1970). 'The Aesthetic Field', CC Thomas, Springfield, Ill.

Dindler, C. and P. Dalsgaard (2009). "Peepholes as Means of Engagement in Interaction Design". Nordes 2009 - Engaging Artifacts. Oslo, Norge, Nordes – Nordic Design Research.

TAGS

2009 • aesthetic appreciation • aesthetic disinterestedness • aesthetic encounters • aesthetic engagement • aesthetic enquiry • aesthetic field • aesthetic of disinterestedness • aesthetic perception • aestheticsArnold Berleantart appreciationart objectartworks • Christian Dindler • Classical arts • contemporary artexplanatory concept of engagementimmersive experience • Nordic Design Research • participatory engagement • Peter Dalsgaard • physical interaction • traditional aesthetics

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
06 APRIL 2014

Limitations of the Decision Cycle Model of Interactive Interfaces

"One central idea missing from the decision cycle model is the notion that goals are often not fully formed in an agent's mind. As anyone who has ever tried to write an essay knows, we do not always act by moving through a decision sequence where we have a clear idea of our goal. Often we explore the world in order to discover our goals. We use the possibilities and resources of our environment to help shape our thoughts and goals, to see what is possible, and we have no clear idea of what we want to do any more than we always have a clear idea of what we are going to write before we begin the process of writing. This is a different orientation than the classical Cartesian view that we know things internally and just communicate fully intact thoughts in external vehicles. In this more dynamic interactionist view, the action of externally formulating thoughts is integral to internally formulating them too. We do not have a clear and distinct idea in mentalese awaiting expression in English or French. The very action of putting 'thoughts' in words helps to formulate them. If this is generally true about many of our actions it means that the goal of an interactive interface is not merely to allow users to do what they want to do, it must also allow them to discover what they want to do. ...

The overhaul I propose to the decision cycle model begins by noting that the way we cope with badly formulated goals and plans is by relying on two facts: we tend to operate in the same workplace over time, and we are usually clever enough to figure out on-line what we must do next. If one observes most creative activity it is apparent that there are both planful and improvisational elements to it. Creative activity is improvisational because agents are opportunistic -- they pursue ideas and possibilities as they emerge regardless of whether those ideas or possibilities have been anticipated. Creative activity is planful because the skilled agent tries to prepare the environment so that he or she has the greatest chance of stumbling on excellent ideas and possibilities. Thus, although an agent may not know, in advance, what he will create, he knows that by doing certain actions, or by arranging the environment in a certain way, or by laying out certain tools, he is doing the best he can to put himself in a position to recognize unimagined possibilities. This setting up the environment to facilitate on-line choice and improvisation I call preparation. It is a key component of skilled activity. There are others. To accommodate them in a decision model requires adding new forms of action, and new forms of interactivity throughout the decision cycle."

(David Kirsh, 1997)

TAGS

1997active learning • agent-environment-agent loop • approaches to ambiguitycognitive sciencecomputational complexity • David Kirsh • decision cycle model of interaction • discovery through designDonald Norman • dynamic interactionist view • ecological approach to cognition • educational constructivism • Edwin Hutchins • environment maintenance • environment preparation • event cognition • explanatory concept of engagement • exploratory actions • human computer interactionimprovised method • interactive interfaces • interactive learning environments • James Gibson • Jim Hollan • John Bransford • learning environment design • mental processes • mentalese • naming process • perception is interactive • personal exploration of phenomena • reshaping the cognitive congeniality of the environment • Robert Shaw • sensory feedback • theory of interactivity • visibility and recognition

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
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