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Which clippings match 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' keyword pg.1 of 2
28 DECEMBER 2013

Connectivist Learning Theory

"A central tenet of most learning theories is that learning occurs inside a person. Even social constructivist views, which hold that learning is a socially enacted process, promotes the principality of the individual (and her/his physical presence–i.e. brain–based) in learning. These theories do not address learning that occurs outside of people (i.e. learning that is stored and manipulated by technology)... In a networked world, the very manner of information that we acquire is worth exploring. The need to evaluate the worthiness of learning something is a meta–skill that is applied before learning itself begins. When knowledge is subject to paucity, the process of assessing worthiness is assumed to be intrinsic to learning. When knowledge is abundant, the rapid evaluation of knowledge is important. The ability to synthesize and recognize connections and patterns is a valuable skill. Including technology and connection making as learning activities begins to move learning theories into a digital age. We can no longer personally experience and acquire learning that we need to act. We derive our competence from forming connections. Karen Stephenson states: 'Experience has long been considered the best teacher of knowledge. Since we cannot experience everything, other people's experiences, and hence other people, become the surrogate for knowledge. 'I store my knowledge in my friends' is an axiom for collecting knowledge through collecting people.

Connectivism is the integration of principles explored by chaos, network, and complexity and self–organization theories"

(George Siemens, P2P Foundation)

TAGS

accepted knowledge • Albert Bandura • Albert-Laszlo Barabasi • Andrew Clark • Brent Davis • Chris Jones • collective knowledge • complexity of views • connection forming • connections and patterns • connectivism • conventional wisdom • Dave Cormier • David Rumelhart • David Wileydigital age • embodied cognition • Ernst von GlasersfeldEtienne Wengerevaluate and select • evaluate worthiness • evaluation skills • Gavriel Salomon • George Siemens • heedful interrelating • I store my knowledge with my friendsindividualismisolated individualJames Gibson • James McClelland • Jean Lave • Jerome Bruner • Karen Stephenson • Karl Weick • know-how • know-what • know-who • knowledge collectionknowledge commons • knowledge evaluation • knowledge synthesis • learning is socially enacted • learning theory • Lev VygotskyLudwig Wittgenstein • Mark Mason • Marshall McLuhan • Martin de Laat • Marvin Minsky • meta-analysismetacognition • Michael Spivey • Neil Postmannetwork societynetworked world • networks are everywhere • P2P Foundation • patterns of connections • patterns of knowledge • paucity • Paul Churchland • recognition rules • Ronald Barnett • Roy Pea • self-organisation theories • self-organising systemsensemaking • Seymour Papert • shared knowledge • shared learning interests • situated learning • social cognitive theory • social construction of knowledge • social learning theory • social-constructivist approach • Starr-Roxanne Hiltz • systems thinkingwicked problems

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
11 DECEMBER 2013

Nicolas Bourriaud: Postproduction

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TAGS

amateur cultural productionartistsboundary-crossing • collective story • consumerismcontemporary artcritical discoursecultural and social relationscultural technology • culture of use • database as cultural formDIYDIY craftsDJforms • historised • Hunter College • Jerome Sans • Ludwig WittgensteinMarcel Duchamp • network on signs • new audio theory • new modes of production • newness • Nicky Enright • Nicolas Bourriaud • paths through culture • post • post-productionproduser • programme forms • protocols of usereinterpretationrelational aestheticsremix culturesamplerscriptible • site of navigation • social and cultural forms • sociality • tabula rasa • the new • theory of substantial formstoolsusevisual artwork of art • zone of activity

CONTRIBUTOR

Liam Birtles
07 NOVEMBER 2013

The Strange Death of Ordinary Language Philosophy

Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) "was identified mainly with British analytic philosophers of the last mid–century and more specifically those at the University of Oxford. Its chief practitioners were regarded to be such philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), J. L. Austin (1911–1960), P. F. Strawson (1919–), Paul Grice (1913–1988) and John Wisdom (1904–1993). From the late 1940s to the early 1960s OLP was an integral part of the mainstream of analytic philosophy; as Stephen Mulhall (1994: 444) has pointed out, when a leading introductory textbook of the era spoke simply of 'contemporary philosophy,' it was OLP that was being referred to. Currently, however, OLP is not generally viewed as a legitimate intellectual option for philosophers, analytic or otherwise. In fact it's safe to say that, with the possible exception of Bergson's and Driesch's vitalism, OLP is the most deeply unfashionable of all the main currents of twentieth–century Western philosophy. It has fallen victim to what Stan Godlovitch has called philosophy's equivalent of 're–touching family photos, old Kremlin–style' (2000: 6)."

(Tommi Uschanov, April 2001)

TAGS

20th century • analytic philosophy • British • contemporary philosophy • erasure • Gilbert Ryle • Hans Driesch • Henri Bergsonhistory of ideasintellectual history • John Austin • John Wisdom • languagelegitimate knowledge • legitimate scholarly texts • legitimationlinguistic philosophyLudwig Wittgensteinmid-century • ordinary language philosophy • Oxford analysis • Paul Grice • Peter Strawson • philosophysociology of knowledge • Stan Godlovitch • Stephen Mulhall • unfashionable • University of OxfordWestern philosophy

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
29 MARCH 2013

Abductive Reasoning as a Way of Worldmaking

"What is the function of abductive inference? For [Charles Sanders] Peirce it is 'the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that something must be; induction shows that something actually is operative; abduction merely suggests that something may be' (CP 5.171, cf 1991a, p.333). Abduction may thus be conceived of as a principle that allows us to reconstruct how conceptual order is achieved through the imposition of a hypothesis (in the form of a minimal theory, an idea, a rule or a law–like hypothesis) – which inaugurates constructivist thinking. Here I can only hint at the great variability of this schema; it enables us to bridge the traditional gap between the arts and the sciences because it can be used as a model both of explanation and of understanding."

(Hans Rudi Fischer, pp. 368, 2001)

Peirce, Charles Sanders (CP). (1931–35, 1958) "Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce". Bd. I–VI (1931–34) ed by Ch. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Vol. VII–VIII (1958) ed. By A.W. Burks. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1991a), Naturordnung und Zeichenprozeß. Schriften über Semiotik und Naturphilosophie. Hrsg. und eingeleitet von Helmut Pape. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp.

Foundations of Science, special issue on "The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science", edited by A. Riegler, 2001, vol. 6, no.4: 361–383. "Abductive Reasoning as a Way of Worldmaking", Hans Rudi Fischer, Heidelberger Institut für systemische Forschung und Therapie, Kussmaulstr. 10, D–69120 Heidelberg, Germany.

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TAGS

2001 • abduction • abductive inference • abductive reasoningarts and sciencesCharles Sanders Peirceconstructivismdeductive reasoning • explanatory hypothesis • Foundations of Science (academic journal) • Hans Fischer • hermeneutical procedures • hermeneuticshypothesisinductive reasoninginferenceinterpretation of experience • knowing as inferring • knowledge of the world • language gameslogical rationalitylogical rules of inferencelogical-analytical paradigm • logically false • Ludwig Wittgenstein • manufacturing of knowledge • material environment • paralogical reasoning • paralogism • paralogy • philosophical construction • praxis of living • rationalityreasoning • retroduction • rule system • rule-following • rules of thought • synthetic thinking • traditional logic • worldmaking

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
08 JANUARY 2009

Ludwig Wittgenstein: family resemblance undercutting the philosophical model of essences and universals

"What is family resemblance? Family resemblances are nests of properties, similarities, relations that the things picked out by a general term bear to each other. So Wittgenstein is claiming that, for a family concept, there is no one thing in common among all the objects falling under it.

The nomenclature of 'family resemblance' underplays the variegation that [Ludwig] Wittgenstein is pointing to. For in families, the resemblances of the members depend on a fairly limited number of features. Hence the terminology doesn't completely forestall a misunderstanding, that what is at issue in family resemblance terms is a number of reasonably homogeneous subclasses or subrelations.

But the 'game' example illustrates the point much better. The motley of features can't be readily surveyed, and new cases can always bring in new features. 66 is meant to emphasize this, which is why Wittgenstein plays out the example to some extent. (And we are meant to play it out even more.) Each time that we think of a feature as setting up a large and homogeneous subclass, we see that it fails. Counterexamples are rife. (There are attempts in the literature to rebut Wittgenstein by giving a definition of 'game', but to my eye they fail ludicrously.)

What is the point? Wittgenstein wishes to undercut the philosophical model of essences, or universals, or Platonic forms (or Fregean concepts, or...) as being what underlies the application of general terms. (To get at the traditional way of thinking about this, see Russell's chapter on universals in The Problems of Philosophy. He exhibits quite clearly the philosophical motivations for thinking that we need universals.)

The attack, at first blush, amounts to this: Why think that there is the determining thing? There may be one or many things. For at least some general terms, it is a mistake to think that there is a common property that is possessed by all the objects to which the general terms apply. There is nothing definable in simpler terms that underlies general terms. So we see that, although some of our concepts possess easily statable necessary and sufficient conditions, but others do not, and yet we still operate quite well with them."
(Professor Warren Goldfarb, Dept. of Philosophy, Harvard University)

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TAGS

conceptualisationfamily resemblancelanguage games • logical atomism • Ludwig WittgensteinPlato • Platos Theory of Forms • relationsimilaritiesuniversals • Warren Goldfar

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
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