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22 JULY 2014

Substance Dualism, Property Dualism and Mind-Body Dualism

"Consider the following three Cartesian theses:

Substance dualism: Any substance with mental properties lacks material properties and any substance with material properties lacks mental properties.

Property dualism: Mental properties and material properties are different properties.

Real distinction between mind and body: The mind and the body are numerically distinct substances.

How are these theses logically related? Substance dualism is the strongest of the three, and entails the other two. It entails the real distinction between mind and body. For the mind is a substance with mental properties, and the body is a substance with material properties. Now if the mind lacks material properties, and the body lacks mental properties, then the mind and the body cannot be the same substance. But the real distinction between mind and body does not entail substance dualism. For that mind and body are two numerically distinct substances is compatible with both of them having both mental and material properties.

Substance dualism also entails property dualism. For if a substance with mental properties lacks material properties, then mental and material properties are different properties–otherwise, a substance with mental properties would be a substance with material properties. But property dualism does not entail substance dualism. It could be that mental properties and material properties are different properties and yet a substance with mental properties is also a substance with material properties.

But the real distinction between mind and body and property dualism do not entail each other. It could be that mind and body are numerically distinct substances but mental and material properties are the same. For instance, it could be that mind and body are distinct because they have different properties: the mind has a property M that the body lacks, and the body has a property B that the mind lacks. This does not preclude that both M and B are both mental and material properties. So the real distinction between mind and body does not entail property dualism. Nor does property dualism entail the real distinction between mind and body. For even if mental and material properties are different properties, it can still be the case that the mind, which has mental properties, and the body, which has material properties, are the same substance."

(Gonzalo Rodriguez–Pereyra, pp.70–71)

Rodriguez–Pereyra, G. (2008). "Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance". Journal of the History of Philosophy 46(1): 69–90.
Fig.1 Lucy Jones "Philosophy of the Mind Episode Two: Criticisms of Substance Dualism", YouTube.

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bodyCartesian dualismcognitionconsciousnessdefining features of modernitydifferentiationdistinctionsdualism • epiphenomenalism • Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra • introspectionlogical-analytical paradigmmaterial environmentmaterial object • material properties • material realitymaterial space • material substances • material thinkingmaterial world • mental properties • mental substance • mindmind-body dualism • mind-body problem • minds divorced of bodiesobjective knowledgeobjective realityobjectivity • other minds • parallelism • philosophical position • philosophy of mind • physical worldproperties of nature • property dualism • realm of existenceRene Descartesscientifically established objective facts • separability argument • separate thinking • solipsism • soul • subject-object orientated philosophy • subjectificationsubjective conditionsubjectivismsubjectivity • substance dualism

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
06 DECEMBER 2009

ontology: singular and multiple forms of art

"Such attention to practice creates considerable pressure to adopt at least a dualist ontology of art, in the sense that our practices appear to embed a distinction between singular and multiple forms of art. Singular artworks are unique, occurring at only one place at a time. Paintings, collages, carved sculptures, and Polaroids are typical examples of singular works. Multiple artworks are those which are capable of having more than one occurrence in different places at the same time. For example, a novel may have many copies, a play many performances, a film many screenings, and a photograph many prints. Each of the occurrences is, in some way, a full–fledged presentation of the work.

This distinction appears to doom the simplest thought, that all works of art are physical particulars. It may be plausible to claim that a painting is a particular material object, or that a jazz performance is a particular physical event, but one cannot identify Alfred Steiglitz's photograph The Steerage with any one of its prints or Peter Schaffer's play Equus with any one of its performances. As Wollheim (1980) first pointed out, the occurrences are potentially many, and one thing cannot be identical to many distinct things. So too, such works survive the destruction or passing of their occurrences, even such epistemologically privileged occurrences as manuscripts and holographs. They must be some other sort of thing."

(Paul Redding)

Fig.1 Stieglitz, Alfred. The Steerage, 1907

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1907Alfred Stieglitzartartworkcarved sculpturecarvingcollagecreative practicecritical theorydualism • Equus • essential uniquenessholographimmigrantjazz performance • Jewish photographer • manuscriptmaterial objectmateriality • multiple • multiple artworks • multiple forms of art • occurrence • ontologypaintingperformance • Peter Schaffer • photograph • photographic prints • physical eventPolaroid • prints • simultaneity • singular • singular artworks • singular forms of art • singular works • uniquework of art

CONTRIBUTOR

Simon Perkins
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