Not Signed-In
Which clippings match 'Objective Reality' keyword pg.1 of 2
02 FEBRUARY 2016

After Accelerationism: The Xenofeminist Manifesto

"Xenofeminism is gender-abolitionist...Let a hundred sexes bloom! ...[And, let's] construct a society where traits currently assembled under the rubric of gender, no longer furnish a grid for the asymmetric operation of power… You're not exploited or oppressed because you are a wage labourer or poor; you are a labourer or poor because you are exploited..."

(The Laboria Cuboniks collective, 11 June 2015, &&& Journal)



2015 • accelerationism • alien future • alienationalternative visions • aporias of difference • artificial wombs • becomingbody politicsbrave new world • class exclusion • counterculturecritical reinterpretationcyberfeminismdehumanisationdystopian futureearly 21st century • emancipatory potential of technology • exclusionfeminism • foundationalism • freedom from • freedom to • futuristic visiongender politics • gender-abolitionist • groundless universalism • human sexual experience • identity politicsImmanuel Kant • Laboria Cuboniks (collective) • liminalitymanifestomathematical abstractionmeaning-contextsmediated representationmutant sciencenetwork society • Nicolas Bourbaki • nodes of collective agreement • objective realityporous boundaries • prometheanism • protean ambition • race exclusion • radical recomposition • rationalityreterritorialisationselfhood • sexes • state of alienation • synthetic hormones • techno-utopiatechnoculture • technological alienation • transect • transfeminist perspective • transfeminist political project • transgender • transits • transmodernity • transtemporal • visions of the future • xenofeminism • xenofeminist • xenofeminist manifesto • XFM


Simon Perkins
12 JUNE 2015

Belief in the here and now: a Humanist perspective

Written & produced by the British Humanist Association, and narrated by Stephen Fry. Animated by Hyebin Lee. Thank you to Alom Shaha, Craig Duncan, Andrew Copson, and Sara Passmore That's Humanism logo design by Nick Cousin



2D animationafterlifeanimated short filmbelief systemsbeliefs • biological death • British Humanist Association • consciousnesscontemplating mortalitydeathdisembodimentdyingend of life • eternal life • existentialismfaith • faith in nature • fulfilmentheaven • here and now • human consciousnesshumanism • Hyebin Lee • life • making the most of life • material realitymaterial worldmortalitynothingnessobjective realityrationalist perspectiverealm of existence • reincarnation • spiritualityStephen Fry


Simon Perkins
22 JULY 2014

Substance Dualism, Property Dualism and Mind-Body Dualism

"Consider the following three Cartesian theses:

Substance dualism: Any substance with mental properties lacks material properties and any substance with material properties lacks mental properties.

Property dualism: Mental properties and material properties are different properties.

Real distinction between mind and body: The mind and the body are numerically distinct substances.

How are these theses logically related? Substance dualism is the strongest of the three, and entails the other two. It entails the real distinction between mind and body. For the mind is a substance with mental properties, and the body is a substance with material properties. Now if the mind lacks material properties, and the body lacks mental properties, then the mind and the body cannot be the same substance. But the real distinction between mind and body does not entail substance dualism. For that mind and body are two numerically distinct substances is compatible with both of them having both mental and material properties.

Substance dualism also entails property dualism. For if a substance with mental properties lacks material properties, then mental and material properties are different properties–otherwise, a substance with mental properties would be a substance with material properties. But property dualism does not entail substance dualism. It could be that mental properties and material properties are different properties and yet a substance with mental properties is also a substance with material properties.

But the real distinction between mind and body and property dualism do not entail each other. It could be that mind and body are numerically distinct substances but mental and material properties are the same. For instance, it could be that mind and body are distinct because they have different properties: the mind has a property M that the body lacks, and the body has a property B that the mind lacks. This does not preclude that both M and B are both mental and material properties. So the real distinction between mind and body does not entail property dualism. Nor does property dualism entail the real distinction between mind and body. For even if mental and material properties are different properties, it can still be the case that the mind, which has mental properties, and the body, which has material properties, are the same substance."

(Gonzalo Rodriguez–Pereyra, pp.70–71)

Rodriguez–Pereyra, G. (2008). "Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance". Journal of the History of Philosophy 46(1): 69–90.
Fig.1 Lucy Jones "Philosophy of the Mind Episode Two: Criticisms of Substance Dualism", YouTube.



bodyCartesian dualismcognitionconsciousnessdefining features of modernitydifferentiationdistinctionsdualism • epiphenomenalism • Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra • introspectionlogical-analytical paradigmmaterial environmentmaterial object • material properties • material realitymaterial space • material substances • material thinkingmaterial world • mental properties • mental substance • mindmind-body dualism • mind-body problem • minds divorced of bodiesobjective knowledgeobjective realityobjectivity • other minds • parallelism • philosophical position • philosophy of mind • physical worldproperties of nature • property dualism • realm of existenceRene Descartesscientifically established objective facts • separability argument • separate thinking • solipsism • soul • subject-object orientated philosophy • subjectificationsubjective conditionsubjectivismsubjectivity • substance dualism


Simon Perkins
23 DECEMBER 2013

Engagement with the world

"To be human is to be engaged with other people in the world. Yet, there has been a dominant strain of thought, at least in the West, which directs attention primarily to the isolated individual as naked mind. From classical Greece to modern times, engagement in the daily activities of human existence has been denigrated. Plato (340 BC/1941) banished worldly engagement to a realm of shadows, removed from the bright light of ideas, and Descartes (1633/1999) even divorced our minds from our own bodies. It can be suggested that this is a particularly Western tendency, supportive of the emphasis on the individual agent in Christianity and capitalism. But the view of people as originally unengaged has spread around the globe to the point where it is now necessary everywhere to take steps to reinstate engagement through explicit efforts."

(Gerry Stahl, p.12)

Stahl, G. (2011). "Essays in Computer–Supported Collaborative Learning"., Gerry Stahl.


being-in-the-worldcapitalism • classical Greece • Computer Supported Collaborative Learningengagement • human existence • individual agent • individual experienceindividualisationindividualismisolated individualliving in a shared worldlone geniusminds divorced of bodies • naked mind • objective realityobjectivismobjectivist epistemologyPlatorational self-interest • realm of shadows • Rene Descartessocial construction of knowledgesocial interaction • to be human • Western philosophy • Western tendency • worldly engagement


Simon Perkins
03 MARCH 2013

The trouble with Kant's spatial metaphor

"In consequence of this revolutionary assertion Kant states that: 'Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences.' (B/38) On the contrary: '…it is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.' (A/26; B/42)

In other words, Kant asserts that space (and time) are not objective, self–subsisting realities, but subjective requirements of our human sensory–cognitive faculties to which all things must conform. Space and time serve as indispensable tools that arrange and systemize the images of the objects imported by our sensory organs. The raw data supplied by our eyes and ears would be useless if our minds didn't have space and time to make sense of it all. ...

Kant's view of space (and time) is the groundwork of his Critique [of Pure Reason], However the inseparable bond he claimed between geometry and the nature of space serves to undermine his case rather than support it. ...

When Kant refers to geometry, he must mean Euclidean geometry, since Non–Euclidean geometry, the brainchild of the 19th Century, was unknown to him. Hence space, in Kant's philosophical system must conform to Euclidean geometry. Norman Kemp Smith, in his Commentary on the Critique, remarked that for Kant '…space in order to be space at all, must be Euclidean.'

Space, in Euclidean Geometry, is a concept which is independent of the attributes of our human minds and senses. The word Geometry is derived from Greek – geo 'earth', and metron 'to measure', namely 'earth measurement'. With such semantic–conceptual roots its hardly conceivable that Euclid regarded Geometry as divorced from an objective independent space."

(Pinhas Ben–Zvi, 2005, Philosophy Now)

Ben–Zvi, P. (2005). "Kant on Space." Philosophy Now, January/February 2005(49).


cartographic metaphor • Critique of Pure Reason • empirical concept • Euclidean geometryeyes and earsgeometryGottfried Leibniz • human minds • human perception • human senses • human sensory-cognitive faculties • Immanuel KantIsaac Newtonlogical-analytical paradigmmetaphors of reality • nature of space • Non-Euclidean geometry • Norman Kemp Smith • noumena • noumenon • objective independent space • objective knowledgeobjective realityobjective world • outer experiences • philosophical system • self-subsisting realities • semantic construct • sensory organs • space and timespatial metaphorsubjective conditiontime


Simon Perkins

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